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The Absurd Results Doctrine, Chevron, 
and Climate Change 
l. INTRODUCTION 
If Congress tells an agency to do something absurd, is the agency 
forced to comply? Courts have unequivocally constrained agency actions 
with the familiar shackles of the Chevron framework,' but have they also 
provided the agency with a means of escape? Some would argue that 
they have through the "absurd results doctrine," a statutory tool of 
construction that allows an interpretation that departs from the plain 
meaning of the text when a literal reading produces absurd results. 2 But 
is this a license to ignore the Chevron doctrine altogether? This question 
weighs heavily on agencies' approach to statutory interpretation 
generally, but more specifically, recent regulations promulgated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") brought the issue to a head. 
In what Time speculated "could be the most far-reaching 
environmental regulatory scheme in American history,"3 the EPA issued 
what is known as the "Tailoring Rule" effective January 2, 2011, 
establishing a graduated system for the regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions from stationary sources under the Clean Air Act.4 The 
regulation has come under serious fire because it purposely and directly 
conflicts with the written language of the Act and seems to entirely 
ignore the parameters of Chevron. The EPA has simply rewritten the 
applicability criteria for two stationary-source programs prescribed in the 
Act, justifying its disregard for the statutory language in large part 
through the absurd results doctrine. 5 In response, the House of 
I. Chevron U.S./\., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842 43 (1984). 
2. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 ( 1989). 
3. Bryan Walsh, Bailie Brews Over lcPA 's Hmissions Regulations, TIME.COM (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2040485,00.html. 
4. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 31,514, 31,514 (June 3, 20 I 0) (to be eoditied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) [hereinafter 
Tailoring Ru/ej. For a summary of the rule, sec ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAl. RULE: PREVENTION 
OF SJ(iNIFICA:--IT DETERIORATION AND TITLE V GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE FACT SIIEET, 
amilahle at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20 I 00413fs.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 20 II). 
5. Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,516. The EPA also listed two peripheral justifications 
for the rule: the "administrative necessity" doctrine, and the "one-step-at-a-time" doctrine. !d. 
However, these justifications take a back seat to and merge with the absurd results doctrine 
throughout the rule. See id. at 31 ,517 ("Each of these doctrines supports our action separately, but 
the three also are intertwined .... "). The absurd results are defined in part by the agency as the 
73 
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Representatives has proposed legislation designed to kill the regulation,(' 
both houses of Congress have engaged in heated debates regarding the 
rule,7 and some states and other groups, public and private, have filed 
litigation in hopes of stopping the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions 
through the Clean Air Act.x 
This Article proposes an innovative approach to the absurd results 
doctrine vis-a-vis Chevron, the avoidance approach, which introduces the 
tried and effective avoidance canon of statutory interpretation into the 
regulatory context. Under this approach, an agency interprets a statute in 
a way that avoids absurd results Congress did not intend, utilizing the 
proper tools of statutory construction while maintaining the integrity of 
the statutory text and the constraints of Chevron. To lay the foundation 
necessary to make this case, Part II of this Article begins by setting out 
how the courts traditionally have used the absurd results doctrine. It also 
discusses the doctrine's limited application up to this point in the context 
of the Chevron analysis. Part III then describes the relevant portions of 
the Clean Air Act that arc in play in the EPA's Tailoring Rule. This Part 
mainly focuses on the differences in the mandates of the Clean Air Act 
and the Tailoring Rule and how the EPA justifies them. Part IV outlines 
the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches to applying the 
absurd results doctrine to the Tailoring Rule. Specifically, the EPA's 
approach takes the route this Article refers to as nullification, meaning 
that if a literal reading of the statute produces absurd results, the agency 
can nullify that language and rewrite the statute to create a more 
appropriate outcome. On the other hand, many critics of the EPA's 
approach to the Tailoring Rule lean on tcxtualism, which exclusively 
utilizes a literal reading of the statute and wholly rejects the usc of the 
absurd results doctrine under any circumstances. In Part V, this Article 
advances the avoidance approach to the absurdity doctrine. Although the 
idea of avoidance in statutory interpretation is not new, such an approach 
is a novel way to frame the absurd results doctrine in the context of 
Chevron. This Part demonstrates why the avoidance approach is superior 
to the other approaches and how the EPA's usc of the nullification 
administrative burdens that would result Ji·om !~tiling to take a one-step-at-a-time approach to 
implementation of the rule in full. !d. at 31,547 (stating that a full and literal implementation of the 
statute "would create. . impossible administrative burdens"). 
6. Associated Press, Hou.\'1' GO!' Readil's Ran on /:'1'.1 Grl'l'!ifllill.l'<' Gm ill'gularions, 
FoxNFWS (Feb. 2, 20 II). http://www. foxnews.com/usi20 11102'02/house-gop-rcadics-han-cpa-
grcen house-gas-regu Ia t ions/. 
7. Elana Schor and Sarah Abruzzese, ,)'!'noll' /Jems Gear Uf' /o Raffle 1/ouw GO!' on 1:'/'A 's 
Climale Rl'gs, N.Y. TIMFS (Jan. 2, 20 II). http://www.nytimcs.com/gwirc/20 II /0 I /07/07grccnwirc-
scnate-dcms-gear-up-to-battle-house-gop-on-cpa-
22X3 5. html 'lscp-12&sq-epa%20ghg'Y.,20rcgulations&st-cse. 
X. Si'i', <'.g .. Coal. For Responsible Regulation v. I' I' A. No. 09-1322. 20 I 0 WI. 55091 X7 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2010) (consolidating eighty-seven cases). 
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approach to the absurd results doctrine will affect the Tailoring Rule as 
the EPA meets the challenges in court. Part VI concludes this Article. 
II. THE ABSURD RESULTS DOCTRINE 
The absurd results doctrine is a tool of statutory interpretation the 
courts have traditionally used to justify an interpretation that departs 
from the plain meaning of the statute when a literal reading would 
produce absurd or incongruous results.9 In other words, "[t]he plain 
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in 
which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.' In such cases, 
the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls." 10 
The doctrine is by no means new; the Supreme Court has utilized it 
for more than a century. 11 "Its authority derives from its pedigree and, 
more fundamentally, from common sense." 12 The flagship example is 
encompassed in the 1868 case of United States v. Kirby. 13 There, a 
sheriff was prosecuted for "obstructing and retarding" the delivery of 
mail when he arrested a postal worker in the process of delivering mail. 14 
Upon review, the Court stated, "All laws should receive a sensible 
construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as 
not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will 
always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to 
its language, which would avoid results of this charaeter." 15 
The Court justified the interpretation through common sense, giving 
the following examples: 
The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by 
Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted, that whoever drew 
blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity, did not 
extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in 
the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by 
Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner 
9. United States v. Ron Pair Enters .• 489 U.S. 235. 242 (1989), quoted in Tailoring Rule, 
supra note 4, at 31,542. 
I 0. !d. at 242 (second alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 
45R U.S. 564.571 (1982)) (internal citations omitted). 
II. See. e.g., Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 531 (2007) (noting the 
"incongruous results" that would result from a literal construction of the statute); Rector v. Holy 
Trinity Church, 143 U.S. 457,461 (1892) (stating that laws should not be construed to produce an 
"absurd consequence"). 
12. Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of' Literalism: Defining the Absurd 
Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 138 (1994). 
13. 74 U.S. 482 (1868); see also Dougherty, supra note 12, at 138 39. 
14. Kirhy, 74 U.S. at 484 85. 
I 5. !d. at 486 87. 
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who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, docs not extend to a 
prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on tire-for he is not to be 
hanged because he would not stay to be burnt. 11' 
These examples have been cited in numerous opinions invoking the 
absurd result doctrinc. 17 
Perhaps because the absurd results doctrine asks courts to substitute 
their judgment over that of the legislative branch, the Court has 
repeatedly taken the position that the absurd results doctrine should only 
be used in rare or exceptional cases.' x While it is true that the courts' 
"task is to give effect to the will ofCongress," 19 the courts must observe 
that "where [Congress's) will has been expressed in reasonably plain 
terms, 'that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusivc."'20 Even 
in cases where further investigation into congressional intent is 
necessary, the court must first look to the text before venturing into 
legislative history or elsewhere. "There is, of course, no more persuasive 
evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the 
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. " 21 Further, the 
absurd results doctrine is not a license for the courts to rewrite the 
statutes. In many cases, the remedy "lies with Congress and not with l the 
courts]. Congress may amend the statute; [the courts] may not. " 22 
Some circuit courts have also discussed the usc of the absurd results 
doctrine in the context of Chevron, although these cases arc surprisingly 
rare. The Chevron test, to which all administrative agency regulation 
must conform, first asks "whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issuc."23 If so, "that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congrcss."24 On the other hand, "if the statute is 
Ill. !d. at 4X7 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
17. Sec, e.g .. K Marl Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 4X6 U.S. 2X I, 325 n.2 ( 19XX); Bacnder v. Barnett, 
255 U.S. 224, 226 ( 1921 ); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, -\(J I (I X92); .1ce also 
Mova Phar111, Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d I 060, I 06X (D.C. Cir. 199X ); United States v. Men do/a, 
565 F.2d 12X5, 12XX n.2 (5th Cir. 197X); Anderson v. Rives, X5 F.2d 673,675 n.l (D.C. Cir. 193h). 
IX. See Grirlin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 45X U.S. 564, 571 (19X2) (quoting Comm'r v. 
Brown, 3XO U.S. 563,571 (1965)); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 4X9 U.S. 235.242 (19X9). C'j. 
"/iii loring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,542 (comparing the statement of the D.C. Circuit in In rc 
Nofziger, 925 F.2d 42X, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991 )). 
19. Griffin, 45X U.S. at 570. 
20. /d. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. (iTI' Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102. lOX 
( I'!RO)). 
21. !d at 571 (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534.543 ( 1940)); see 
also Pub. Citizen v. United States. 491 U.S. 440,454 (I9X9) (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 14X F.2d 
737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)) ("'[T[he words used [in the statute[, even in their literal sense, arc the 
primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning .... '"). 
22. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 576. 
23. Chevron U.S./\., Inc. v. Natural Res. Del'. Council, Inc., 46 7 U.S. X.1 7, X42 ( I9X4 ). 
24. /d. at 842 43. 
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silent or ambiguous ... the question for the court is whether the agency's 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."25 The 
absurd results doctrine applies in this context, but what if the 
unambiguous expression of Congress results in absurdity? 
The D.C. Circuit has made clear that even in the case of absurd 
results an agency must abide by the Chevron doctrine and respect the 
language of the statute. In Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, for 
example, the D.C. Circuit invalidated a Food and Drug Administration 
("FDA") regulation based on the absurd results doctrine?6 Congress 
enacted a statute permitting generic drug manufacturers to file an 
abbreviated application for approval with the FDA based on the assertion 
that the generic drug docs not infringe on the original drug 
manufacturer's patent.27 The statute allowed the first such applicant to 
exclusively market his generic drug for 180 days from "the date of a 
decision of a court ... holding the [original drug manufacturer's] patent 
to be invalid or not infringed."n This "exclusivity period" would allow 
the first applicant to "market his generic drug without competition from 
other [generic drug] applicants."29 The FDA was concerned that the 
statute would produce absurd results if the first applicant was never sued 
or if it lost the initial suit because later applicants would be indefinitely 
delayed from marketing similar generic drugs. 30 In an attempt to remedy 
the problem, the FDA issued a regulation, which disallowed the 
exclusivity period unless the applicant had also "successfully defended 
against a suit for patent infringement brought within 45 days of the 
patent owner's receipt ofnotice,"31 known as the "win-first rule."32 
The court explained that the proper role of the absurd results doctrine 
in the context of Chevron is to avoid a reading that produces absurd 
results but not at the expense of the statutory language. According to the 
court, "[t]he rule that statutes are to be read to avoid absurd results 
allows an agency to establish that seemingly clear statutory language 
does not reflect the 'unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,' and 
thus to overcome the first step of the Chevron analysis."33 As in all 
Chevron reviews, the agency must then provide a permissible 
construction of the statute; however, "the agency does not thereby obtain 
25. !d. at 843. 
26. 140 FJd 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
27. !d. at 1063. 
28. !d. at 1064 (citing 21 U.S.C. ~ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994)). 
29. !d. 
30. !d. at 1067. 
31. !d. at 1065 (emphasis removed) (quoting 21 C.F.R. ~ 314.1 07(c)( I)). 
32. !d. at 1069. 
33. !d. at I 068 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. De f. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842 ( 1984)) (internal citation omitted). 
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a license to rewrite the statute .... [I]t may deviate no further from the 
statute than is needed to protect congressional intcnt."14 
In the end, the court ruled that the FDA's regulation was 
"inconsistent with the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," 
language that points directly back to the original Chevron analysis, for 
two reasons: first, because it was "gravely inconsistent with the text and 
structure of the statutc,"15 and second, because the FDA's change was 
not "needed to avoid 'a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of 
[the] draftcrs."'36 The court prohibited the FDA from performing a 
statutory "transplant operation" when "corrective surgery" would 
suffice. 37 In other words, "the successful-defense requirement [was 
simply] too blunt an instrumcnt."3x 
In another case, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the 
majority opinion for the D.C. Circuit in American Water Works Ass 'n v. 
EPA, which followed substantially the same reasoning. 39 There, the 
organic statute required the EPA to apply a maximum contaminant level 
("MCL") for contaminants that could affect human health 40 but also 
gave the EPA the authority to set a different "treatment technique" 
instead of an MCL if it found that setting an MCL was not 
"'economically or technologically feasible."'41 Instead of using the plain 
meaning, the EPA interpreted the word "feasible" to mean "capable of 
being accomplished in a manner consistent with the [statutcj."42 In this 
case, the EPA felt that a literal reading of the statute would produce an 
absurd result because if an MCL was applied to water, it may reduce one 
contaminant, but it would dramatically increase othcrs.43 
The court concluded that when the absurd results doctrine applies, 
the agency must abide by Chevron's guiding principles and may not 
stray from what is reasonably within the bounds of the statute. Despite 
the presence of absurd results, the court did not allow the agency to 
ignore the Chevron doctrine, evaluating the EPA's interpretation of the 
term according to whether it was rcasonablc.44 The court ruled that 
"where a literal reading ... would lead to absurd results," the term 
becomes '"the proper subject of construction by the EPA and the 
34. /J. 
35. !d. at 1069. 
36. !d. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Fnters., 4X9 U.S. 235, 242 ( J9g9)) 
37. !d 
3X. !d. at I 074. 
39. 40 F.3d 1266, 126X (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
40. !d. at 1269. 
41. !d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. ~ 3001( I )(C)(ii) ( 1994 )). 
42. !d. at 1270 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43. /d.atl27071 
44. !d. 
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courts. "'45 Under Chevron, the agency's interpretation must be 
reasonable in order to be proper.46 After a thorough evaluation, the court 
found the EPA's interpretation to be reasonable,47 carefully choosing 
language to operate inside the Chevron framework. 
Having set out the legal framework, this Article now provides some 
background of the Tailoring Rule and how it relates to the absurdity 
doctrine. 
III. THE MECHANICS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
AND THE TAILORING RULE 
The Clean Air Act contains two perm1ttmg programs that are 
affected by the EPA's Tailoring Rule: Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration ("PSD") 4x and Title V.49 These programs are triggered 
when the EPA finds that an emission "cause[ s ], or contribute[ s] to, air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health 
or welfarc,"50 commonly referred to as an "endangerment finding."51 
Emitters subject to these programs must comply with significant 
substantive and procedural restrictions. 52 The express terms of the Clean 
Air Act set out clear numerical criteria indicating which emitters are 
subject to the programs.53 The Tailoring Rule rewrites these numeric 
terms to increase the applicability criteria several hundred fold, severely 
reducing the number of emitters that must comply with the programs' 
. 54 
reg UJrements. 
A. Massachusetts v. EPA and the PSD and Title V Programs 
ln Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court ordered the EPA to 
either issue an endangerment finding for greenhouse gas emissions or 
provide reasonable grounds for why it declined to do so under the Clean 
Air Act.55 In this case, several states and local governments filed suit in 
federal court after the EPA denied a petition to regulate greenhouse gases 
45. /J. (quoting Chern. Mtrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126 
( 1985)). 
46. /d. ("We must derer to the EPA's interpretation of'feasible' if it is reasonable .... "). 
4 7. /d. 
48. 42 L.S.C. §§ 7470 7492 (2006). 
49. /d.§§7661 7661f. 
50. !d. § 7521 (a)( I). 
51. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,534 (2007). 
52. SC'e42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 766lc. 
53. SeC' inj'ra Part IliA. 
54. Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31 ,516. 
55. 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 (2007). 
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under the Clean Air Ac('1' The EPA submitted a "laundry list of 
reasons," which the Court rcjcctcd. 57 For example, the agency claimed 
that not only did it lack authority to regulate greenhouse gas as a 
pollutant, but also that the legislative history of the Act, other 
enactments, uncertainty, conflicting regulation, and possible interference 
with foreign policy all justified its decision. sx 
The Court found that the expansive scope of the definition of 
pollution clearly granted the EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse 
gases, including carbon dioxiJc.59 Although the EPA claimed that 
Congress did not intend to usc the Clean Air Act "to regulate substances 
that contribute to climate changc,"1'0 the Court found this line of 
reasoning was not viable because "the statutory text foreclose[ dl" such a 
rcading, 61 and there was no reason "to accept [the] EPA's invitation to 
read ambiguity into a clear statutc."62 Instead the Court required the EPA 
to provide a "reasonable explanation" in the case of inaction "as to why 
it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether 
[greenhouse gas emissions contribute to pollution ]."1,] As a result of the 
Court's decision, the EPA changed its position, issued an endangerment 
finding, and later promulgated the Tailoring Rule based on the absurd 
results doctrine to apply the PSD and Title V programs to greenhouse gas 
. . 64 
emiSSIOnS. 
The PSD and Title V programs protect air quality through a variety 
of permitting requirements, which can be time consuming and costly for 
those facilities that fall under their jurisdiction.(l5 The PSD program 
56. !d. at 510, 514. 
57. !d. at 533. 
SX. !d. at 51 I 14. 
59. !d. at 52X 29. 
60. /d. at 52X. The EPA has since completely reversed itself on this issue. now linding that 
Congress did intend to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. h1iloring Nule. 
supra note 4, at 31,55 X (""Looking at these provisions and the legislative history together. we think 
Congress can be said to have intended that the PSD program apply to CiHCi sources as a general 
matter."); see generai!J' Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings lin· (irecnhouse (lases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act. 74 Fed. Reg. 6(,,496 (June.'\. 2010) (to be codilied at 40 
C.F.R. ch. I) [hercinaller Lndangi!nnclll Finding[. 
61. Massachuse//s, 549 U.S. at 52S. Oddly enough. this language suggests that Justice 
Kennedy approached the case Ji·om a new textualist point or view, and may have been open to an 
absurd results argument. 
62. !d. at 53!. 
63. !d. at 533. 
64. li1iloring Nulc, supra note 4, at 31 ,S 19. 
65. PSD applicants arc subject to a lengthy permitting process, which by Ll'A estimates cost 
the applicant X66 hours and $X4,500. !d. at 31,534. This includes waiting l(n the !'Pi\ to conduct a 
notice and comment period on the pending <lpplication. !d. at 31,520. Once an applicant becomes a 
permit holder, the EPA pertimns a thorough review of the lilcility and requires the rcnnit holder to 
employ the Best Available Control Technology. referred to as BACT, to prevent air quality 
deterioration. !d The permit holder must also usc its own resources to .. analy/e impacts I \rom the 
emissions[ on ambient air quality[,[ soil, vegetation, and visibility." !d. Under certain 
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applies only to what qualifies as a "major emitting facility" under the 
Clean Air Act.66 Major emitting facilities are defined in the Act as those 
facilities emitting "one hundred tons per year or more of any air 
pollutant" if they are one of the twenty-eight types of stationary sources 
enumerated in the statute, and "any other source with the potential to 
emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant. "67 
Any stationary source emitting less than this amount will not be 
regulated by the PSD program, regardless of whether the source is 
. . II 6X em1ttmg po utants. 
The Title V program's applicability is structured in a manner similar 
to the PSD program. Title V is limited to "any stationary facility or 
source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, 
one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant. "69 Also like the 
PSD program, any source emitting less than this amount is not regulated 
by the Title V program regardless of its emissions. 70 This Article will 
refer to these original PSD and Title V applicability requirements 
collectively as the "100/250 rule" because they are so similar, and 
because, as will be shown below, the Tailoring Rule alters both programs 
in a similar manner. 
circumstances, additional requirements will be imposed depending on the quality of the air. !d. 
Although these measures may improve air quality for the surrounding community, it is nonetheless 
costly to those subject to the PSD program. Title V is also designed to protect air quality by 
imposing numerous procedural obligations upon those who fall under its regulation. The EPA 
estimates that every applicant will spend 350 hours and $46,400 to finish the application. !d. at 
31,534. In addition, Title V applicants must conform to several time-consuming and costly 
requirements to ensure their compliance with the Clean Air Act, such as a "public notice and a 30-
day public comment period, including a period for a public hearing," an "EPA and affected state 
review," and an "application completeness determination." !d. at 31,521. Permit holders are also 
subject to '"[p jermit revisions and re-openings" if new requirements arise or the holder makes 
changes to the source. !d. Like the PSD program, while these procedural requirements assist in 
providing clean air, they impose serious costs on the applicants. 
66. 42 U.S.C. ~ 7479(1) (2006). The PSD program applies to attainment and nonattainmcnt 
areas; however, the EPA does not anticipate that nonattainment areas will apply to greenhouse gas 
emission. Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,520. 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). 
68. /d. This is standard for almost all types of pollutants governed by the PSD program. !d. 
Hazardous pollutants are regulated at a much lower standard under the Clean Air Act, id. § 
7412(a)( I), but that is outside the scope of this comment. 
69. /d. § 7602U). When dealing with "hazardous air pollutants," Title V's applicability is 
expanded to "any stationary source or group of stationary sources located within a contiguous area 
and under common control that emits or has the potential to emit considering controls, in the 
aggregate, I 0 tons per year or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any 
combination of hazardous air pollutants," id. § 7412(a)(l ); however, that is outside the scope of this 
article. 
70. !d. § 7602(j). 
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B. The EPA's Use of"the Ahsurd Results Doctrine 
and the Tailoring Rule 
The EPA's explanation of the absurd results doctrine rests mainly on 
the Supreme Court's articulation in United States v. Ron Pair 
Enterprises, which states that "in the rare cases rin whichJ the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of the drafters * * * [in which case] the intention of the 
drafters, rather than the strict language, controls."71 It then explains how 
the absurd results doctrine applies to the first and second steps of the 
Chevron test.72 Regarding step one, the EPA states: 
Under these circumstances, [which produce absurd results,] the agency 
must not take the literal meaning to indicate congressional intent. As 
the DC Circuit has explained, where a literal reading of a statutory term 
would lead to absurd results, the term simply has no plain meaning * * 
* and is the proper subject of construction by the EPA and the court. 
Under these circumstances, if the agency can find other indications of 
clear congressional intent, then the agency must implement that intent. 
This may mean implementing the statutory terms, albeit not in 
accordance with their literal meaning, but in a way that achieves a 
result that is as close as possible to congressional intcnt. 73 
The EPA then asserts that when a literal meaning of the statute leads to 
absurd results, and there is either no other indication of congressional 
intent or there are '"multiple ways of avoiding a statutory anomaly, all 
equally consistent with the intentions of the statute's drafters,"' then the 
agency should evaluate the question under Chevron step two, "'based on 
a pennissible construction of the statute. "'74 
The EPA then applies the doctrine to justify rewriting the 
applicability requirements in the Clean Air Act through the Tailoring 
Rule. 75 According to the EPA, a literal application of the Act to 
greenhouse gas emissions, using the l 00/250 rule, produces absurd 
results by "creat[ing] undue costs for sources and impossible 
administrative burdens for permitting authorities."71' For example, a plain 
71. Tailoring Rule. supra note 4. at 31,542 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. 
Ron Pair Enters., 4X9 U.S. 235, 242 ( 19X9)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The EPA also gives 
numerous examples or articulations or the doctrine lrom the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit. 
See geni'rallv iJ. at 31,542 43. 
72. !d. at 31,545. 
73. !d. at 31,545 4ti (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Am. Water 
Works Ass'n v. EPA. 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters .. 
4X9 U.S. 235, 242 43 ( 19X9)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74. !d at 31.546 (quoting Mova !'harm. Corp. v. Shalala. 140 F.3d I 060. I OtiX (D.C. Cir. 
199X)). 
75. /d. at 31,516. 
76. /d. at 31.54 7. The i'P A estimates that leaving the applicability criteria as is would 
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reading of the statute would increase current PSD applications from 280 
per year to 82,000 per year, "virtually all of which would be smaller than 
the sources currently in the PSD program and most of which would be 
small commercial and residential sources."77 The impact on Title V 
applicants would be even more extreme, increasing the number of 
applicants from 14,700 per year to 6.1 million per year. n Like those 
sources swept into the PSD program, "[t]he great majority of these will 
be small commercial or residential sources." 79 Therefore, the EPA 
devised a plan to eliminate these absurd results by implementing a two-
step process to streamline application of the Clean Air Act to greenhouse 
gas CmiSSJOnS.xo 
This two-step process "tailor[ s] the applicability criteria that 
determine which [greenhouse gas] emission sources become subject to 
the PSD and title V programs."x 1 In other words, it rc\vrites the level at 
which sources become subject to the Clean Air Act. The first step 
replaces the I 00/250 rule with a 75,000 rule.x2 The Tailoring Rule 
therefore rewrites the definition of "major emitting facility" to include 
those sources emitting greenhouses gases in excess of 75,000 tons per 
year instead of 100 or 250 tons per year depending on the type of 
stationary sourcc.x3 Additionally, step one will apply to only those 
sources that already arc required to permit under the PSD or Title V 
programs. x4 
Step two again rewrites the statute by eliminating the 100/250 
applicability criteria and replacing it with a 75,000/100,000 criteria. xs 
According to the EPA, those sources "not already subject to Title V that 
emit, or have the potential to emit, at least 100,000 [tons per year] will 
become subject to the PSD and title V requirements."x6 Also, "sources 
that emit or have the potential to emit at least I 00,000 [tons per year] and 
that undertake a modification that increases net emissions of [greenhouse 
gases] by at least 75,000 [tons per year] will also be subject to PSD 
· ,x7 
reqmrements. 
increase applications 300 fold for the PSD program and 400 fold for the Title V program. /d. at 
31,554, 31,562. 
77. !d. at 31,556. 
78. !d. at 31 ,562. 
79. !d. 
80. !d. at 31,516. 




85. !d. at 31,547. 
86. /d. 
87. !d. 
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Clearly, each step in the Tailoring Rule is a direct departure from the 
express terms of the statute. By changing the clearest of the words 
contained therein-the numerical minimums that trigger the statute's 
applicability-the EPA disregards the plain meaning of the statute in 
favor of criteria it has determined will produce an acceptable number of 
applications for the PSD and Title V programs. While this solves the 
problems of overwhelming the EPA and regulating small sources, it 
reaches beyond the viable bounds of the absurd results doctrine by 
HX WJ declaring war through agency fiat on the express terms enacted by the 
Legislative Branch. 
lY. FRAMING THE DISCUSSION: NULLIFICATION AND TEXTUALIST 
APPROACHES, THE ENDS OF THE SPECTRUM 
The absurd results doctrine could present itself in a plethora of ways. 
This Article now sets the framework for the analysis by focusing on the 
nullification and textualist approaches. The nullification approach 
represents the most liberal usc of the absurd results doctrine and is 
espoused by the EPA in its approach to the Tailoring Rule. If a literal 
reading of the statute would produce absurd results, this approach allows 
the agency to nullify the language of the statute and to replace it with 
language that yields results the agency feels arc more appropriate. On the 
other hand, the textualist approach represents the opposite extreme of the 
spectrum. This approach eschews any usc of the absurd results doctrine, 
accepting the text as the exclusive tool for statutory interpretation. These 
distinct approaches set the stage for a novel approach to the absurd 
results doctrine in the context of Chevron, known as the avoidance 
approach, which dictates that in interpreting a statute, an agency should 
construe the language in a way that avoids absurd results without 
rewriting the statute or adhering blindly to its written language. 
A. The Nullification Approach 
The nullification approach proposes that where a literal reading of 
the statute would produce absurd results, the agency may nullify the 
express terms of the statute and replace them with its own language to 
achieve what the agency perceives as a more acceptable result. This best 
represents the EPA's current approach to the Tailoring Rule. Some case 
law appears to support this approach to the absurd results doctrine; 
RS. See Coyle v. United States. 415 F. 2d 4RX. 490 (4th Cir. llJ6R) (finding that the agency 
interpretation was "at war with both the language of the statute" and Congress' intent). 
X9. For an analogous discussion of "judicial fiat," sec Li 1'. YelloH· ( "uh ( ·o of ( ·ut .. 5.12 P.2d 
1226, 1246 (Cal. 1975) (Clark. J., dissenting). 
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however, this support may be somewhat artificial. 9° For example, in 
American Water Works Ass 'n v. EPA, the Court characterized the absurd 
results doctrine as authorizing the agency to completely strip the 
meaning from the words used in the statute: "where a literal reading of a 
statutory term would lead to absurd results, the term simply 'has no plain 
meaning ... and is the proper subject of construction by the EPA and the 
courts.'"91 Other decisions disregard all natural meaning from the written 
words of the statutes. For example, in Lynch v. Overholser, the Court 
concluded that interpretation is not limited "to the bare words of a statute 
... for 'literalness may strangle meaning. "'92 These expressions of the 
absurd results doctrine may be among the most expansive. 
Other support for the nullification approach stems from the fact that 
applying a strictly literal interpretation of a statute that produces absurd 
results destroys the rule of law by undermining "the coherence of the 
legal system as a whole."93 For example, in Green v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co., a convicted felon filed a product liability suit for an injury 
he sustained during a work release program.94 At trial, the manufacturing 
company introduced evidence of his criminal background, which resulted 
in a jury verdict for the dcfense.95 The evidentiary rule allowed 
admission of such certain criminal history if '"the probative value ... 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. "'96 The issue for the 
Court was whether it should read the rule literally, using the balancing 
test to limit evidence only against criminal and civil defendants but not 
against civil plaintiffs. 97 The Court rejected a literal reading because it 
would dismantle the coherence of the legal system by "offend[ing] 
fundamental principles of special protection for criminal defendants and 
equal treatment of civillitigants."98 In other words, a literal reading could 
not stand in the face of constitutional protections, such as the Equal 
Protection and the Due Process clauses. 99 Allowing an absurd literal 
reading would "establish a precedent in conflict with other parts of the 
legal system, and thereby undermine the system's coherence" and 
90. Language from other cases could just as easily be used to seriously cabin the doctrine. 
See. e.g., Pub. Citizen v. United States, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Griftin 
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 45X U.S. 564,576 (19~Q). 
91. 40 FJd 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Dcf 
Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985)). 
92. 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962) (citations omitted) (quoting Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 
39,44 (1946)). 
93. Dougherty, supra note 12, at 134. 
94. 490 U.S. 504, 506 ( !9X9). 
95. !d. 
96. !d. at 509 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. EviD. 609(a)). 
97. /d.at511. 
9X. Dougherty, supra note 12, at 134 nn.29 & !95. 
99. Gr!"cn, 490 U.S. at 510. 
86 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 26 
destroy the rule of law. 100 
The nullification approach also is bolstered by reasonableness and 
common scnse.
101 Harkening back to the original examples of the absurd 
results doctrine from Kirby, no reasonable person would require that a 
physician who had "opened the vein of a person that fell down in the 
street in a fit" to save his life should be punished by a law that prohibits 
"dr[awing] blood in the streets." 102 Equally, no reasonable person would 
require that "a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire" should 
be "hanged because he would not stay to be bumt." 10' Common sense 
tells us that the enacting legislature in no way intended these results. It is 
even more preposterous to assume that Congress intended a court 
capable of exercising common sense to nevertheless apply the law 
literally and sanction the absurd result when it has the power to avoid it. 
In fact, the ordinary person likely relics heavily on the absurd results 
doctrine based on these two prcmises. 104 In the case of an absurd result, 
such a person would say to himsclt: 'That makes no sense at all-[thc 
law] can't mean that." 105 The person would then likely operate according 
to what they believe the law should reasonably say. Failing to correct the 
words of a statute, which literally read produce absurd results, would 
destroy its common-sense foundation, as well as confidence in the legal 
system. 
Despite the aforementioned support, the nullification approach 
suffers under withering cntictsm. First, case law, founded in 
constitutional doctrine, docs not support an agency rewriting the express 
terms of a statute. In Griffin v. Oceanic Contractor, Inc., the Court 
forcefully declared this opposition to the nullification approach. 106 While 
recognizing that the absurd result doctrine is appropriate in some cases, 
the Court made clear that express statutory terms must not be 
disturbcd. 107 Displaying its respect for the separation of powers and 
statutory primacy, the Court held, "It is enough that Congress intended 
100. Dougherty. SUf!I'IJ note 12, at IJ4. i\s Veronica Dougherly roinls out. in this way the 
absurd results doctrine is a necessary rart or literalism because it serves "'the rrinciral or legislative 
surremacy wh1ch literalism is meant to serve." /d. Without it "'literalism could not serve the rule or 
law." !d. 
I 0 I. !d. at 162. i\dditionally, statutory language is olien slow to keer up with the changing 
circumstances of reality. Sn:. <'K. Jonathan D. Barker. Societ1· ·.,. C 'ami1·ores. Both Good and Bad. 
Thl' lntl'rnl't Wir<'lup: Whv We Need II, and How It Should he Regulated, 74 UMKC L. Rl\'. 945 
(2006). The nullilication approach is bolstered hy the argument that the Legislative Branch is unable 
to address every possible situation. 
I 02. United States v. Kirby. 74 U.S. 4X2, 4X7 (I X6X). 
103. !d. 
I 04. Dougherty. supra note 12, at 162. 
I 05. !d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
I 06. 45X U.S. 564, 565 ( 19X2). 
I 07. !d. at 576. 
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that the language it enacted would be applied as we have applied it. The 
remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies 
with Congress and not with this Court. Congress may amend the statute; 
we may not." 10x Doing so would encroach upon the legislature's 
constitutionally allocated powers. In the agency context, rewriting the 
statute may violate other constitutional parameters, such as the nan-
d I . d . 109 e egatiOn octnne. 
Further, in Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. as described above, the court 
condemned adding language not included in an agency's organic 
statutc. 110 Although the court applied the absurd results doctrine, it 
pointed out "the agency does not thereby obtain a license to rewrite the 
statute." 111 When the absurd results doctrine applies, "[the agency] may 
deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect congressional 
. , 1 12 I · · d c "[ ] I , 1 n · h mtcnt. ntcrpretatJon ts reserve 10r g enera terms · wtt 
"contours [that arc] left undefined by the statute itself." 114 Common 
sense behind a single statute docs not trump these constitutional 
concerns. Courts will not ignore the strictures of the Constitution to 
honor an agency's interpretation of its organic statute. 
Perhaps most importantly, allowing an agency to rewrite a statute 
destroys the Chevron framework. This is something the Court will not 
allow. Chevron dictates a two-step process for evaluating whether an 
agency has stepped outside of its statutory authority. First, the court asks 
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue." 115 If so, "that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congrcss." 116 The Court also has determined on numerous occasions that 
"[t]here is ... no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute 
than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to 
its wishes." 117 On the other hand, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous ... 
108. !d. 
109. Sc!' Indus. Union Dep't. AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum lnst., 448 U.S. 607, 673 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (plurality opinion) (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)) 
("'That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is a principle universally 
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of govemment ordained by the 
Constitution."'). 
II 0. 140 F.3d I 060, I 068 ( 1998). 
Ill. !d. 
112. !d. 
113. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482,486 (1868). 
114. S!'e Pub. Citizen v. United States, 491 U.S. 440, 452 (1989) (defining "utilize" as a 
"woolly verb"). 
115. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. DeL Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
116. ld at 842 43. 
117. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940); see also Huffman v. W. 
Nuclear, Inc .. 486 U.S. 663, 664 (1988); Griftin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 
( 1982); Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 ( 1966). 
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the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
. "b] . fh ,IIX pcnmss1 c construction o t c statute. 
Allowing an agency to nullify the text of the statute and replace the 
words with whatever it determined would produce a reasonable result 
eliminates the best evidence of congressional intent. The constitutionally 
blessed congressional enactment trumps agency preference, even when 
what Congress intends seems absurd to the agency. Otherwise, although 
Congress may have spoken to the precise issue, it would no longer be the 
end of the matter, which would obviate the first step of Chevron. The 
second step would also be void because once the agency has changed the 
best evidence of congressional will, a permissible construction of that 
will molds to whatever the agency chooses. Doing so removes any 
intelligible principle from the statute and allows an agency to run 
roughshod over the legislative power constitutionally reserved to 
Congress. 
The EPA embraced this approach in its interpretation of the 
Tailoring Rule, which creates an untenable outcome for greenhouse gas 
regulation. Substituting the plain language of the statute's I 00 or 250 
tons per year to qualify for the PSD and Title V programs with 75,000 or 
I 00,000 tons per year unabashedly rewrites the statute. Although some 
d b . b d . b" f: h" 110 wor s arc am tguous, or may c usc m an am 1guous as Ion, no 
word is less ambiguous than a number. Its meaning is virtually 
unmistakable. Therefore, interpreting it to mean anything but its plain 
meaning is contrary to the statute, violates Chevron, and eliminates the 
best indicator of congressional intent. Contrary to the EPA's position, the 
very fact that a true tcxtualist approach would produce absurd results 
may indicate that Congress never intended the Clean Air Act to apply to 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
B. The Tcxtua/ist Approach 
The tcxtualist approach represents the opposite end of the 
interpretation continuum from the nullification approach. This approach 
uses the text as the exclusive tool of intcrprctation. 120 Under no 
circumstances would it be appropriate to allow the usc of the absurd 
results doctrine and construe a statute contrary to its plain meaning. This 
approach rejects the absurd results doctrine because it is susceptible to 
II S. Cher"l"on. 467 U.S. at S43. 
119. See infi·a Part IV. B. 
120. This approach is not the '"new tcxtualism" described by some scholars. Sn· gmera/h· 
William N. Eskridge. Jr.. The New J('xlua!ism. 37 UCLA L. RI'V. 621 ( 1990); Abbe R. (iluck. the 
Srares as Lahoraroril.'s o/Sialulmy lnlc!prcrarion: Ml!lhodological Consensus and rlw Ne11· Modified 
l('xlualism. Ill) YALE L.J. 1750 (20 I 0). 
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abuse by the agency utilizing it and it is based on unauthoritative 
documents. 
The textualist approach draws its support primarily from case law 
that ratifies the primacy of the statutory text in the context of 
interpretation. Courts generally will begin with "the familiar canon of 
statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is 
the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative 
intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as 
conclusive." 121 This respect for statutory text stems from more than a 
century of jurisprudence, including Justice Holmes's famous quote that 
"[ w ]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the 
statute mcans." 122 In other words, "[t]he words of the statute, and not the 
intent of the drafters, are the law." 123 
Support for this approach finds additional support in traditional 
justifications of strictly textual interpretation. The text of the statute 
offers fundamental notice and reliance assurances to those required to 
obey the law. Although contrary to Dougherty's position that the average 
person will rely on what he believes the law should be, 124 the argument 
can be made that the average person will instead rely on the statute as 
written. It strains logic to suggest that the lay person goes any further 
than the statutory text for the full meaning of the law. Using the elusive 
idea of congressional intent or the spirit of the law would only serve to 
undermine what the average citizen considers the full statement of the 
law, creating notice and reliance problems. 
Textualism also finds support in the constitutional structure. This 
approach embraces the idea that the legislature, and only the legislature, 
is entitled to write the statute. 125 The structure of the Constitution is 
offended when a member of the judiciary branch "interprets" the law so 
extensively as to rewrite its provisions, regardless of what legislative 
material the judge may claim as his basis. Additionally, the text of the 
121. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 ( 1980). 
122. Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results. Scrivener's Hrrors. and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. 
CiN. L REV. 25, 26 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Oliver Wcndellllolmes, The Theory u/ 
LeKal lntl!lpretation, 12 HARV. L REV. 417, 419 (1899)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Many 
times Congress may have more than one intention or implication for important legislation. See, ex.. 
Andrew Barker, "!'feasant Scenes" or Nazi Icons~ Returning Art Wrongfully Confiscated During 
World War II, 71 UMKC: L. REV. 841. 857 (arguing that Congress passed the Holocaust Victims 
Redress Act spccilica!ly to "restore property to Jewish victims of the Nazis" but that it also "showed 
the steps the United States was willing to take to fix the problems of wartime property 
contiscation"). 
123. Gold, supra note 122 at 26 n.8 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original 
Intent in Statut01y Construction, II HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 59,60 (1988)). 
124. Dougherty, supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
!25. "A// legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, 
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, ~ I (emphasis 
added). 
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statute is the substance on which every representative in the Legislature 
has voted, and it has passed the requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment. Congress's opportunity to speak is given in this format and 
no other. 126 These procedures act as a refiner's fire for potential 
enactments, eliminating bills and ideas. The text of the statute is supreme 
and should be regarded as the final word of what the law is. 127 
The tcxtualist approach eschews the absurd results doctrine because 
of its potential for abuse and the materials upon which it is based. These 
criticisms arc best represented in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in 
Puhlic Citizen v. United States, m although Kennedy himself is not 
opposed to the proper usc of the doctrine. There, a statute required that 
any committee "utilized by the President" must make its records 
available to the public. 129 The Court found that giving the word "utilized" 
its usual meaning would produce the absurd result of applying these 
requirements to every "fonnal organization, from which the President or 
an Executive agency seeks advice," which would include even the most 
miniscule contacts. 130 Therefore the Court delved into an extensive 
search of the statute's legislative history to determine the true meaning of 
the word "utilized." 131 
Concurring in judgment, Justice Kennedy criticized an expansive 
approach to the absurd results doctrine because of "its susceptibility to 
abuse." 132 The doctrine allows a judge to substitute his own will for that 
of Congress based upon materials that have no judicial authority. 133 Such 
a "loose invocation of the 'absurd result' canon of statutory construction 
creates too great a risk that the Court is exercising its own 'WILL instead 
of JUDGMENT,' with the consequence of 'substitut[ing] [its own] 
pleasure to that of the legislative body. '" 134 Kennedy warns, "lT]hc 
problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less the views of the world 
whence they come than the views of those who seck their advice." ll:i 
Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the Court should not 
"rummage through unauthoritativc materials to consult the spirit of the 
legislation in order to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute 
I 26. Easterbrook, supra note 123, at 60 (noting the inadequacy of legislative history). 
127. Gold. supra note 122, at 26 (stating that where the text is unambiguous. "I tlhe court's 
determination of the objective meaning of the statute ends the inquiry''). 
12X. 491 U.S. 440 (19X9). 
129. /d. at 446 47. 452 (emphasis added). 
130. !d. at 452 (citation omitted). 
131. !d. at 473 74 (Kennedy, J .. concurring). 
132. !d. at 474. 
133. .)'cc gencrallv id. at 469 X2. 
134. /d. at 471 (alterations in original) (quoting Tttl' I'Fili'RAI.IST No. 7X, at 4h9 (i\. Hamilton) 
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961 )) 
135. /d. at 473. 
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with which the Court is more comfortable." 136 
In this way, a textualist approach respects the Chevron analysis. The 
first step of the Chevron analysis asks whether Congress has spoken to 
the precise issue. 137 The text is the greatest indicator of congressional 
intent. No one would be justified in accusing an agency of overstepping 
its bounds if the agency simply looked to the formal, constitutionally 
sanctioned text of the statute it is interpreting. Again in the second step, 
an agency's interpretation will almost certainly be found reasonable if it 
ties closely to the textual contours of the statute it is construing. 13R 
Conversely, agencies often run into trouble when their construction of a 
statute is far from the plain meaning of its terms. 139 Even more so when 
the terms of the statute have been nullified and replaced with what the 
agency feels is more suitable for the facts and circumstances at hand. 140 
In recent years, however, the tcxtualist approach has been subjected 
to increasing criticism. A strict textualist approach has been almost 
completely eradicated, being replaced in most cases with a hybrid 
approach to statutory interpretation simply because a strictly tcxtualist 
approach nearly is impossible. 141 This is a corollary of the fact that 
common sense, as well as longstanding judicial philosophy, tells us that 
reading a statute literally, despite the absurd outcome, offends traditional 
notions of fairness and justice on which the law is based. Words are 
inherently ambiguous and Congress uses them in an ambiguous manner, 
and applying a strict textualist approach runs directly contrary to 
previous iterations by the Court of what is appropriate to consider in 
analyzing congressional intent under Chevron. 
First, a strict tcxtualist approach contradicts common sense and 
longstanding case law when such a reading would produce an absurd 
result. As articulated in the aforementioned classic examples of the 
absurd results doctrine in Kirby, it strains logic to advocate for punishing 
a physician who offers medical assistance or a prisoner who escapes a 
fire. 142 Ignoring this fundamental notion of common sense, which has 
guided judicial philosophy for more than a century, 143 in favor of a 
strictly literal reading, unnecessarily restricts the agency from 
considering the full variety of factors that justify its statutory 
construction. 
136. !d. 
137. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council. Inc .• 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
138. /d. at 843. 
139. See, e.g, Mova Pharrn. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
140. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,570 (1982). 
141. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 ( 1989) (finding that a 
literal reading would conflict with constitutional rights). 
142. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
143. Sec supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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Literal reading becomes almost impossible considering the inherent 
ambiguity of the words themselves and the ambiguous nature of their usc 
by legislators. If this be conceded, a purely tcxtualist approach becomes 
extremely problematic. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out "lT]he 
problem derives from the very nature of words." 144 Words arc simply 
"symbols of meaning ... [that] seldom attain[] more than approximate 
precision. " 145 As a result, they "can hardly achieve l the] invariant 
meaning or assured definiteness," which would be necessary to justify 
relying exclusively on the statutory text. 14(' This requires the agency to 
look beyond the statutory text and find the true meaning elsewhere. 
Further, even if the meaning of each word were perfectly clear, 
Congress uses the words of statutes in an ambiguous manner. Whether it 
is the result of unintentional error, a "deliberate legislative choice to 
leave conflictual decisions to agencies or the courts, or the result of 
social or legal developments the most clairvoyant legislators could not 
have forcsccn," 147 the result is the same: the statute's meaning cannot be 
determined without consulting other indicative material. In fact, in the 
case of unforeseen circumstances, it is doubtful that even a perfectly 
drafted statute would make any difference at all. 14x A statute's meaning 
cannot always be deciphered from the naked text. The futility of a strictly 
tcxtualist approach is highlighted by the position of modern textualists, 
most famously Justice Atonin Scalia, who accept the absurd result 
doctrine, albeit in a more-limited form. 149 
Finally, a strictly textualist approach is inappropriate because it 
cabins the Chevron analysis beyond what has been permitted by case 
law. As mentioned above, the well-known Chevron test consists of two 
steps aimed at extracting congressional intent. At the first step of the 
Chevron analysis, the Court has charged the judiciary with "employing 
traditional tools of statutory construction [to] ascertain[] that Congress 
had an intention on the precise question at issuc." 1511 The text of the 
statute is just one tool in the interpreter's tool belt. Although there is 
some debate on what these tools arc, 151 certainly by virtue of the usc of 




147. Eskridge. supra note 120. at 677 (citations omitted) (citing William N. Eskridge . .Jr.. 
/)\·nw11ic Statu/orr ln!l!rpretolion. 135 U. PA. L. RIY 1479. 1506 II (llJX7)): see also Ciold. Sllfil"ll 
note 122. at 40. 
14R. Eskridge, supra note 120. at 677 (citations omitted) (citing William N. Eskridge . .Jr.. 
/JynamicS!aluloJTintcrpretation, 135 U. I'A. L. RJ·:v. 1479.1506 II (19X7)). 
149. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co .. 490 U.S. 504, 527 (Scalia . .1 .• concun·ing) (requiring 
legislative proof"tojustifya dep<lrturc from the ordinary meaning" of the text). 
150. Chevron U.S.i\.,lne. v. Natural Res. Del". Council,lnc .. 467lJ.S. X37. X43n.9 (19X4). 
151. See. e.g.. Melina Forte. Mm· IA'gislatil'e Historr he ConsidNed at ( 'hel'ron Step One:' 
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the plural form of the word "tools," they contain more than just the text. 
The Court has been more explicit at Chevron step two, authorizing the 
judiciary to extract congressional intent "based on the text, structure, and 
legislative history." 152 Restricting Chevron step two to simply the text is 
contrary to the appropriate evaluation of an agency's interpretation of a 
statute. If a court were to simply ignore the structure or legislative 
history that pointed toward a different interpretation of the statute, it 
could expect to be reversed. 
Both the nullification and the textualist approach offer some 
beneficial insights of how to approach the absurd results doctrine; 
however, both arc also plagued by problems that cannot be squared with 
statutory text, case law, and the Chevron doctrine. This Article now 
offers an innovative method to interweave the absurd results doctrine and 
Chevron, known as the avoidance approach. While avoidance has been 
used in other interpretive contexts, its application in the Chevron context 
has not yet been explored, and it offers the best balance of the two 
extreme approaches described above, while avoiding the problems that 
make each of them untenable. 
V. THE A VOIDANCE APPROACH 
The avoidance approach offers agencies a dynamic balance of the 
nullification and textualism approaches to the absurd results doctrine in 
the Chevron context. It incorporates the benefits and avoids the extreme 
situations of the other two approaches by offering a reasonable middle 
ground. The agency has the opportunity to freely utilize all of the 
traditional tools of construction prescribed in Chevron but is prohibited 
from completely rewriting the statute to comport with its own desires. It 
respects the parameters set out in case law at both the Supreme Court and 
appellate court levels. If the EPA were to adopt this approach as the 
baseline for its greenhouse gas regulation, the Tailoring Rule would 
stand a much better chance of surviving the impending scrutiny of the 
courts. 
The avoidance approach is designed to avoid the extremes of the 
nullification and textualist approaches and allows the agency to make use 
of all the Court-sanctioned tools of interpretation. It leaves the statutory 
language intact, while ensuring that an absurd result is not exacted upon 
unsuspecting parties. Generally, the meaning of the text would be 
respected; however, if a literal reading led to an absurd result, the agency 
would find a solution to avoid such an outcome, while still adhering 
The Third Circuit Dances the Chevron Two-Step in United States v. Geiser, 54 VILL. L. REV. 727 
(2009). 
152. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter ofCmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,708 ( 1995). 
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closely to the statutory mandate. 
In this way, the avoidance approach to the absurd results doctrine 
vis-a-vis Chevron functions very similarly to the constitutional avoidance 
canon as articulated in Solid Waste Agency ol Northern Cook Coun(v v. 
United States Army Cmps of'Engineers. 151 In that case, the Clean Water 
Act charged the Army Corps of Engineers with issuing permits for the 
"discharge of dredged or fill material" into "the waters of the United 
Statcs." 154 A problem arose when the Corps issued a regulation, claiming 
that intrastate waters "used as habitat by ... migratory birds which cross 
state lines" would also fall under the Clean Water Act. 155 The Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County challenged this regulation, 
claiming the Corps had "exceeded [its] statutory authority in interpreting 
the [statutc]." 156 The Court's main concern was that the Corps' 
interpretation of the Clean Water Act to include the "Migratory Bird 
Rule" stepped outside the constitutional boundaries of congressional 
power granted by the Commerce Clausc. 157 
The Court applied the avoidance approach to questions of 
constitutionality. "' [W]hcrc an otherwise acceptable construction of a 
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will 
construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is 
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. "' 15x Allowing an agency to 
push the constitutional envelope of congressional power requires "a clear 
indication that Congress intended that rcsult." 159 If no such indication is 
present, the Court will interpret the regulation to avoid the constitutional 
issue completcly. 1w This rule is based on the Court's "prudential desire 
not to needlessly reach constitutional issues and our assumption that 
Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret 
a statute to push the limit of congressional authority." 1<' 1 
The avoidance approach to the absurd results doctrine works in a 
similar way. Simply put, where a construction of a statute would produce 
absurd results, the agency should construe the statute to avoid them 
unless those results were clearly Congress's intent. This is not a license 
153. 531U.S.I59(2001). 
154. /d. at 163 (quoting 33 U.S.C. ~~ 1344(a). 1362(7) (2000)) (internal quotation mark> 
omitted). 
155. /d. at 164 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 41.206.41.217 (Nov. 13. 19X6) (to be codilied at :u 
C.F.R. pts. 320 30)). 
156. /d. at I fl5 66. 
157. /d. at 172 73. 
15X. /d. at 173 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Ciulf( 'oast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 4X5 U.S. 56X, 575 ( 19XX)). 
159. /d. at 172 (citing /JeBarlolo Corp .. 4X5 U.S. at 575). 
160. ld 
161. /d. at 172 73. 
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to rewrite the statutory language or ignore the mandate of Congress. 
Rather, it is the innovative application of a tried interpretive tool to a new 
context. The approach is based on respect for the legislative process. The 
agency assumes that Congress acts responsibly and constitutionally and 
does not authorize agencies to change the statutory text. The Court's 
acceptance of the avoidance approach in other interpretive contexts 
makes it more likely that the Court would be willing to accept a 
regulation from an agency based upon the same approach. 
This avoidance approach may be referred to as step 1.5 in the 
Chevron analysis. At step one, courts will consider whether Congress has 
spoken to the precise issue. 162 At this new step 1.5, courts will then ask 
whether a literal reading of the statute will produce absurd results. If so, 
the statute will be construed to avoid such results unless Congress has 
clearly intended the absurd outcome; however, the agency is still 
required to operate within the Chevron framework and will not be 
allowed to rewrite the statute or disregard its express terms. In this way, 
step 1.5 would also affect the second step of Chevron, which provides 
that if Congress has not spoken to the precise issue, the agency must give 
a permissible construction of the statutc. 163 Since Congress is presumed 
not to have intended absurd results, under step 1.5, a permissible 
construction of the statute would not reflect an absurd result. 
Regardless of its incorrect choice of approach, the EPA simply has 
chosen the wrong time to utilize the absurd results doctrine. Had the EPA 
applied the avoidance approach to its greenhouse gas regulation, the 
regulation would look much different than its current form. Ironically, 
the EPA seems to have applied the textualist approach when deciding 
whether greenhouse gases should be regulated by the Clean Air Act. 164 
When confronted with comments regarding the costs and administrative 
burdens that would surely accompany the regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions, 165 the EPA dismissed the arguments, directing these 
162. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. De f. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 ( 1984). 
163. !d. at 843. 
164. Sec 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,50 I (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1 ). 
165. /d. at 66,515 ("These commenters contend that the incredible costs associated with using 
the inllexible regulatory structure of the CAA will harm public health and welfare, and therefore 
EPA should exercise its discretion and find that greenhouse gases do not endanger public health and 
welfare because once EPA makes an endangerment finding under CAA section 202(a), it will be 
forced to regulate greenhouse gases under a number of other sections of the CAA, resulting in 
regulatory chaos."). Commenters also warned the EPA that because of the strict structure of the 
Clean Air Act, once the EPA decided to regulate greenhouse gas emission, it would not be able to 
stop the required regulation. !d. The EPA dismissed this argument as well through a somewhat 
condescending analogy, stating that "the question of whether the cure is worse than the illness is 
different than the question of whether there is an illness in the first place." /d. It seems the EPA was 
swept away in the current of the statute it has been charged with implementing. Additionally, the 
EPA's contention that the Supreme Court requires it to decide whether to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions solely on science and not policy is irrelevant in this context because the EPA did not raise 
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commcntcrs to "take up their concerns with Congress, not [the] EPA." 1M 
At that time, the EPA was confident in its ability to "take a measured 
approach to address greenhouse gas emissions." 1<' 7 Now that the EPA 
finds that administering the Clean Air Act to greenhouse gas emissions 
creates a self-imposed, impossible administrative burden, it has left the 
tcxtualist approach behind and converted to the opposite extreme of the 
spectrum, the nullification approach. Had the EPA taken these 
commentcrs seriously, it would have recognized the absurd results that 
would follow from its decision to apply the Clean Air Act to greenhouse 
gas emissions. lt should have employed the avoidance approach to the 
absurd result doctrine at that time to interpret the statute, instead of 
belatedly trying to cover itself after the damage had been done. 
The ramifications of failing to employ the avoidance approach arc 
severe for the EPA. The Supreme Court may have found for the EPA in 
Massachusetts v. EPA had it employed the avoidance approach to the 
absurd results doctrine at that time. The Court did not rule on whether the 
EPA should issue an endangerment finding; the Court simply ruled that 
whatever the EPA decided, it must give a reasonable explanation for its 
actions. 16x The avoidance approach likely would have given the Cowi the 
"reasonable explanation'' it sought, especially considering the increased 
burdens on small emitters and agency resources that it now uses to justify 
the Tailoring Rulc. 169 If Congress truly had intended greenhouse gas 
regulation, it could have provided the EPA with a governing statute that 
did not produce an absurd result when literally applied. That statute 
could have set an appropriate level of applicability allowing the EPA to 
promulgate regulation instead of legislative amendment without having 
to promulgate a statute-amending regulation. On the other hand, 
Congress could have approved of the EPA's decision not to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions as pollutants by refusing to take up the issue at 
all. In either scenario, the absurd result doctrine would have been used 
appropriately, the Chevron framework would have been respected, and 
the people, through the democratically elected Congress, would have 
decided how such regulation should apply. 
Instead, the EPA has placed itself in the difficult position of hitching 
itself to a runaway train. By determining that Congress intended the 
the absurd results doctrine in that case. See genera//)·. Massachusetts v. El'/\. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
As noted above. the Court has accepted this doctrine ror more than a century unlike the policy 
considerations the EP /\ attempted to usc to persuade the court. !d. at 533 (stating that the LP /\ "has 
otkred a laundry list of reasons not to regulate," including voluntary programs. interference with 
fi.Jreign policy, and the need to avoid a "piecemeal approach" to climate change). 
166. 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,515. Cf Griffin v. Oceanic Contractor. Inc.. 45X U.S. 564, 576 ( 19X2). 
167. 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,516. 
16X. Massachusetts, 54'! lJ.S. at 533. 534. 
169. Sec supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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Clean Air Act to apply to greenhouse gas emissions, the EPA has missed 
its stop. It has waited too long to utilize the absurd results doctrine. The 
only avenue now available is to stretch the absurd results doctrine 
beyond its limits and attempt to rewrite the statute by citing 
congressional intent that cannot justify nullifying the plain language in 
the statute's text. Like in Massachusetts v. EPA, "the statutory text [of 
the Clean Air Act] forecloses" this option 170 and the Court has no reason 
"to accept [the] EPA's invitation to read ambiguity into a clear 
statute." 171 The very fact that the EPA has resorted to such an extreme 
approach to the absurd results doctrine clearly illustrates that it should 
have used the absurd results doctrine as measuring tape to determine 
whether greenhouse gas emissions should be regulated by the Clean Air 
Act, rather than as a crowbar to force it to fit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The avoidance approach presents the best option for the absurd 
results doctrine as a general statutory tool of construction in the 
regulatory context. It offers an innovative approach to blending the 
absurd results doctrine with the Chevron analysis by utilizing a tried and 
effective approach to statutory interpretation in a distinct context. The 
approach eliminates the problems posed by the nullification and 
textualist approaches, while incorporating their strengths. It respects the 
statutory text but docs not exclude other useful tools of statutory 
interpretation sanctioned by the courts and particularly by Chevron. It 
works as an interim step in the Chevron analysis, which allows agencies 
to consider whether a plain reading of the statute will truly effect a result 
never intended. 
The avoidance approach also offers a salutary alternative to the 
problems the EPA has created with its nullification approach to the 
Tailoring Rule. The nullification approach it has employed does the most 
violence to the statutory language by changing the clear numbers of the 
statute. As a result, under the Chevron analysis, the EPA faces an uphill 
battle before the courts. The avoidance approach would have been most 
effective in the beginning by informing the Court that the Clean Air Act 
was never intended to apply to greenhouse gas emissions. Congress 
could have then created a workable statutory scheme for the EPA to 
implement. Instead, the EPA finds itself unable to operate within the 
statutory framework in which it has entangled itself; however, failure to 
170. 549 U.S. at 52 X. As mentioned in footnote 61, this language suggests that Justice 
Kennedy approached the case from a new textualist point of view and may have been open to an 
absurd results argument. 
171. Id. at 531. 
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apply the absurd results doctrine correctly is not now a license to destroy 
the Clean Air Act's provisions and replace them with what the EPA 
deems fitting. Just as the avoidance approach leads to proper statutory 
interpretation generally, it will lead the EPA to the proper application of 
the Clean Air Act to pollution. All agencies should adopt this approach 
to benefit from its respect for Congress, the statutory text, case law, and 
Chevron. 
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